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Abstract: In the process of ensuring successful and full integration, one of the main obstacles is the lack
of knowledge of the state language by ethnic minorities. Despite the fact that Georgia has achieved some
success in building a democratic state, democratic institutions are still weak in the country. Having weak
democratic institutions makes it very difficult to transform diverse religious and ethnic groups into one
civil unit. A lack of trust towards political institutions on the one hand, and the weakness of these institu-
tions on the other, leads to themutual alienation and isolation of different segments of society. TheGeor-
gian government, unlike the Baltic States and Ukraine, by way of teaching Georgian to its minorities, set
increasing their civic integration and activity in civic spaces as a goal. How successful the steps taken in
this regard were is another question.
Key words: ethnic minorities, education, language politics, integration
G
enerally, language and education are perceived as having great importance in
the process of nation-building or nation-formation. Language and education
are the main actors for ensuring the process of communication not only between
different nations, but also in the process of achieving success in civic integration
within one nation-state.
In the process of ensuring successful and full integration, one of the main obstacles
has to be the absence of knowledge by ethnic minorities of the state language (knowledge
acting as a powerful means of communication).
Even after 24 years of independence it is difficult to call Georgia’s public-political
discourse (which is still characterised by a wide range of ethnic diversity) a consolidated,
pluralistic culture based on civic participation. After the collapse of communism, that su-
perficial and fake legitimacy which was based on fear and terror was destroyed. Conse-
quently, together with social and economic problems, some ethnic and religious problems
have appeared, too. Weak democratic institutions still cannot guarantee the transforma-
tion of the society into one civil unit. Consequently, in Georgia, the level of ethnic and re-
ligious alienation is significantly high (Dundua, Abashidze, 2009, p. 12).
Despite the fact that Georgia has achieved some success in building a democratic
state, democratic institutions are still weak in the country. It makes it very difficult to
transform diverse religious and ethnic groups into one civil unit. The absence of trust to-
wards political institutions on the one hand, and the weakness of these institutions on the
other, determine the mutual alienation and isolationism of different segments of society.
The weak economic and social development of the country hinders social collaboration
between religious and ethnic groups. Existing economic and social ties do not promote
the feeling of a common economic market and social environment. Therefore, the collab-
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oration between religious and existing ethnic groups in the country is mostly based on
prejudices and group interests.
It is a paradox that different groups which have lived alongside each other in Georgia
for centuries, know little or nothing about each other’s cultural values and achievements.
The perception of each other’s culture reflects prejudices and stereotypes (Dundua,
Abashidze, 2009, p. 18). As a result, there is factual isolationism (in most cases) of ethnic
minorities.
Taking into consideration the common Soviet tendency to stigmatise historians’ he-
redity, we think it would be interesting to discuss some aspects of several post-Soviet re-
publics’ politics of language. This is also because we think the case of Georgia is
qualitatively different from the other examples given below.
The Baltic States: the Soviet experience
In the Baltic States (which were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940) after regaining
independence in the 1990s, the Russian-speaking population was quite high, especially in
Latvia and Estonia. The Russian-speaking population in Latvia was 45%, and in Estonia
– 55% of the total population. As for Lithuania, only 10% of the population were Rus-
sian-speaking here (Jarve, 2003, p. 76).
Several years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, language protection and a new
language policy became the basis of fighting for the independence of the Baltic States.
Depending on the specifics of the given country’s ethnic composition, all three countries
chose virtually similar policies (although some nuances or differences still existed). For
the Russian-speaking minority (although in the case of Estonia, this ‘minority’ was actu-
ally the quantifiable majority) the main problem was a lack of knowledge of the local na-
tive language. From the leftover ‘goods’ of the Soviet Union, this became an acute
problem in the Baltic countries. A system based on the principles of brotherhood, unity
and the ‘strengthening of nations’ did not promote the importance of knowledge of the
languages of local ethnic groups. Any proceedings on the public level, or at all stages of
the education system – starting from schools and finishing with higher education – for
the Russian-speaking population were freely available in their native language – in Rus-
sian. Accordingly, the knowledge of the native language was practically not of vital im-
portance.
The post-Soviet period
Despite the fact that after gaining independence, language acts were only passed from
1995 to 1999 (with the exception of Latvia – in 1992) in all three states, hints about the
state language were made in various civil laws, which actually allocated even more rights
to the native languages. This situation was compounded by the fact that after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, in contrast to other former Soviet republics, gaining citizenship in
Latvia and Estonia for non-ethnic Latvians and Estonians became possible only through
naturalisation. This process, in turn, included a language test which was difficult for the
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local Russians for the simple reason that they did not know the native language at all, or
their knowledge did not satisfy the requirements. As a result, from 1995–1998 only
11,432 persons were naturalised in Latvia (Jarve, 2003, p. 83).
In general, summing up the policies of the Baltic countries, it can be said that their aim
was not somuch to get the ethnic minorities (in this case using the term ‘minorities’ might
be controversial) studying the native languages and, therefore, promoting the integration
of ethnic Russians, but rather creating conditions for the ethnic Russian-speaking popula-
tion that encouraged their emigration. This assumption is made even more valid by the
fact that in the post-Soviet period, in the light of beginning the naturalisation process and
making laws about the need for local languages, no effort was made by either Latvia
or Estonia to help the non-Latvian and non-ethnic Estonian population to study the local
language.
As for Lithuania, the events developed in a slightly different way. Due to Lithuania’s
reality at the time (where according to the 1989 census about 79% of the population be-
longed to the native population, while only about 10%were ethnic Russians), it is natural
that the language problem was relatively smaller in comparison to Estonia and Latvia.
Accordingly, following the independence of Lithuania, it did not impose an age require-
ments nor begin a process of naturalisation which was virtually doomed to failure in ad-
vance. This demonstrates that the issue of language in Lithuania had a less politicised
character. The knowledge of the native language became compulsory, although on a cer-
tain level (in transport, shops, signs, etc.) operating in any other languages was not forbid-
den. In addition, the Lithuanian government passed a law about the necessity of teaching
everyone the native language in secondary school – regardless of their ethnic origin. This
gives us an opportunity to think about the following:
1) the issue of language being less politicised by the government of Lithuania;1
2) the Language Act and education policy pursued by the Lithuanian government,
which unlike the other two Baltic republics, aimed at teaching the native langu-
age to ethnic Russians and other non-ethnic Lithuanians;
3) Lithuania’s policy in terms of language did not intend to encourage the emigra-
tion of non-ethnic Lithuanians, but, on the contrary, aimed to improve the inte-
gration of non-ethnic Lithuanians into the independent Lithuanian state.
As a result of this policy, the level of the linguistic assimilation and civil integration in
Latvia and Estonia are quite low, and in Lithuania – relatively high (Jarve, 2003, p. 94).
The Ukrainian experience
The problem of national identity in the post-communist transformation period (per-
haps it would be better to use the term ‘creation of a nation’), the politics of language and
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1 However, in exchange for membership of NATO and the European Union, the Baltic States had to
make certain concessions anyway. For example, in Latvia, despite laws being passed on this matter seve-
ral times by the government, in 2002 a presidential amendment was passed – removing the necessity of
elected public officials (at parliamentary and municipal levels) possessing a certificate of proficiency in
Latvian.
civic integration issues have also become one of the most important issues for Ukraine,
like they were for the Baltic States. Like the Baltic States, also in the case of Ukraine, in
the complex process of building statehood, the non-ethnic Ukrainian population (mainly,
naturally, Russian-speaking) became a problem. However, unlike the Baltic States, in the
case of Ukraine, the Russian language and its influence on ethnic Ukrainians and the
method of constructing Ukrainian statehood still remains as a major challenge.
Despite the fact that ethnic Russians constitute one-fifth of the whole population in
Ukraine, Russian is considered a native language for many more. According to a survey,
those who considered themselves ‘Ukrainians’ did not necessarily mean that they consid-
ered Ukrainian as their native language. Soon after independence, public opinion surveys
revealed the reality which existed in Ukraine concerning the Ukrainian and Russian lan-
guages. According to a survey of the population of Ukraine in 1998, 45% of respondents
preferred the Russian language in everyday conversation, 15–16% classified themselves
as bilingual, while 39–40% spoke Ukrainian. Roughly similar results were provided by
a 2001 survey (Stepanenko, 2003, p. 113).
Because of the limited historical experience of Ukrainian statehood, language has be-
come the most important determinant of what should have better defined ethnic identity.
Accordingly, supporters of the declaration of Ukrainian as the sole state language had
their own arguments. In fact, the declaration of the Ukrainian language as the state lan-
guage once again emphasised the sovereignty and independence of the state. This was of
crucial importance, because of Ukraine’s geopolitical location and strategic importance
(taking into consideration its neighbourhood with Russia and that country’s centuries-old
attempts at Russification).
Even before independence, the “Language Act,” adopted in 1989, declared Ukrainian
as the sole state language. Russian, and other languages, are referred to there as languages
for “inter-ethnic relations.” Since then, on all levels, teaching of both Ukrainian and Rus-
sian has been mandatory. The final affirmation of Ukrainian as the only official language
took place in 1996 with the passing of Article 10 of the Constitution, where Russian was
given the status of aminority language (Constitution of Ukraine, Chapter 1, Article 10).
In general, in the homogenisation process, the proper language policy is very impor-
tant, particularly making the state language the dominant language at school level. In the
case of Ukraine, with the background of its very close territorial, cultural, religious and
historical relations with Russia, the problem was the appearance of a sense of national
identity and construction. All of these factors were supported by the fact that the Ukrai-
nian language is very close to the Russian language, which has been facilitated through
the successfully implemented process of Russification over the centuries. Accordingly, in
the case of Ukraine, the problemwas not somuch themultitude of ethnic Russians, whose
number in percentage terms compared to the Baltic States is quite low, but the ethnic
Ukrainians, for a large part of which Russian was considered as a native language.
With this background, the state programme of the UkrainianMinistry of Education on
the development of Ukrainian and other national languages in 1991 is understandable.
The main goal of this programme was learning and entrenching the Ukrainian language
through the mandatory teaching of Ukrainian at schools (the results of this programme
should have become visible by 2000). The educational policy in Kuchma’s period
worked to some extent – from 2000–2001, 70% of pupils were already studying in Ukrai-
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nian, and 29% in Russian (Stepanenko, 2003, p. 123). On the one hand, according to some
experts, it was the right educational policy of Kuchma, which in the process of
‘Ukrainisation’ achieved substantial success. On the other hand, there is also criticism of
this policy, which calls into question the success of that process. The fact that the amount
of education in Ukrainian increased does not necessarily imply less frequent use of Rus-
sian from the same citizens in everyday life as a means of communication.
Despite the efforts at homogenising the nation, it is a fact that ‘Ukrainisation’, initi-
ated and implemented from the top by government, was less able to yield a result. The
cultural and linguistic origins of this problem are more deeply rooted. Political events in
recent years – the replacement of a clearly pro-western policy by an equally clearly
pro-Russian focus (especially up to so-called ‘Maidan events’ of 2014) – show oncemore
that the Russian language and Russian policy in Ukraine have deep-seated roots. In one of
the opinions expressed in 2000 about the topic of the Ukrainian language, which is no less
relevant against the background of the recent political processes (Stepanenko, 2003,
p. 132) three different ways of solving the problems related to language can be suggested:
1) development of a new language system, based upon a combination of the two
languages, something like a new language prototype;
2) the parallel existence of two languages and two cultures, e.g. the Belgian, Swe-
dish, Swiss or Canadian models (also in the Crimean Republic);
3) the swallowing of the less developed language by the more developed language.
That is, the creation of conditions for fair competition between the Russian and
Ukrainian languages.
From today’s perspective we think that the following has clearly been demonstrated:
a) the implementation of the first option is impossible and no steps have been ta-
ken in this direction;
b) the third option – ‘the swallowing’ of one language by another and its practical
expulsion from the public-political arena is such a sensitive issue that it is un-
likely to happen (in this case the fact that the ‘expelled’ language may be Rus-
sian is of secondary importance). However, given the probability that in such
a scenario the Ukrainian language could share a similar fate, we think that this
is less likely to happen. Even the remotest possibility of ‘the expulsion’ of the
Ukrainian language would put national identity and Ukrainian statehood in je-
opardy;
c) the most effective, and least painful option, resulting from the daily reality of
Ukraine, implies the coexistence of both languages, and in principle this has be-
come widespread and established in the modern Ukraine.
Historical retrospective: 19th century Georgia – language and education
“Homeland, language and religion” – almost the whole of the 19th century Georgian
national movement, in general, as well as the main features of the formation of the Geor-
gian nation were based on these three, concise ideas, as formulated by Ilia Chavchavadze,
one of the greatest Georgian writers and public figures. In Georgia, the awakening of the
nation took place around this slogan.
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In the 19th century Georgia, almost all representatives of the middle class knew Rus-
sian. The Georgian elite of that time often spoke Russian in public, in this way they were
emphasising their social status and the fact that they had been educated in Russia.
Getting an education in Russia was widespread because of the absence of such institu-
tions in Georgia. The main problemwas not so much getting higher education in Russian,
and in Russia, but the absence or extreme scarcity of Georgian-language public schools.
The major concern for Ilia Chavchavadze and all the thinkers of that period was the pro-
liferation of education and writing-reading. Education acquired in the native language
should have become a basis for helping to unite Georgian identity, creating and extending
the sense of national identity.
In the background, when the Russian government tried to forbid the term “Georgia”,
replacing it in the press with “Tbilisi and Kutaisi provinces”, steps were implemented by
the Tergdaleulebi (“Tergi-drunks”2): publishing a newspaper (in which issues related to
the problems of the history and culture of Georgia, as well as contemporary political, so-
cial and economic problems, were discussed), a whole series of publications dedicated to
the importance of education and teaching the Georgian language, the establishment of the
Tbilisi andKutaisi provinces’ royal banks (themajority of themoney earnedwas spent on
financing Georgian schools and theatre), the creation of the Society for the Spreading of
Literacy Among Georgians, the opening of primary, temporal schools or the edition of
Georgian language textbooks – this is a short list of the activities that made a great contri-
bution to the creation and development of a national education system, as well as inspir-
ing a sense of nationhood and the construction of a Georgian identity among Georgian
society.
At that time, Georgia’s new social and political classes usually had an ethnic dimen-
sion. For example, the most financially prosperous was the Armenian bourgeoisie, which
was, it is true, local, being of Tbilisi origin, but they stood apart from other ethnic groups
and often had a negative attitude towards them. This was followed by the fact that, in the
statistics of that time, the levels of education and knowledge among ethnic Georgians had
the lowest rate.
The experiences of 1918–1921 (The First Republic of Georgia)
The brief period (1918–1921) of Georgian independence made some corrections to
the relations of ethnic minorities. Representatives of the political elite of that time (social-
ist, as well as right-wing members) ensured the tolerance of minorities in all their legisla-
tion. On the side of the political forces in power at that time, the great focus was on the
determination of ‘the rights of small nations’, which is clearly visible from the Constitu-
ent Assembly’s constitutional committee materials. Before adoption of the Constitution,
at a meeting of the Constitutional Committee held on 20 May, 1920, A. Chkhenkeli3
noted: “There are intimate interconnections between the interests of the whole state and
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2 Tergi – a river in the north of Georgia, on the border with Russia.
3 A. Chkhenkeli – a well-known Georgian statesman (social-democrat) of the independent Georgia
in 1918–1921.
the part of national minorities: one’s happiness is the other’s happiness and one’s trouble
is a trouble for the other. The revival of the state is the revival and enrichment of the mi-
nority. This must be conscious to each minority, while there is not to be any misunder-
standing and distrust; the flourishing of a minority is also in our interests and precisely
from such a consideration of the issue, we present the maximum of rights that the state
gives to the minority” (Matsaberidze, 1996, p. 89).
The ‘maximum of rights’ declared by A. Chkhenkeli, and in general, by the Georgian
political elite of that time, was also reflected in the fact that the ethnic or religious minori-
ties presented various projects concerning certain aspects in the Constitution. Russian
and Armenian National Councils, Greeks living in Georgia, theMuslims of East Georgia,
the Transcaucasian German Union, Jews living in Georgia – each presented their own
project (7 projects in total), and all of them were overflowing with certain distrust to the
newly created Independent State of Georgia. In many cases, satisfying the rights de-
manded by a minority, and including them in the Constitution, was placing even the exis-
tence of Georgia as an independent state under question mark. For example, it is enough
to note the assignment in the agenda prepared by the Russian National Council of ‘lan-
guage equality’, the implementation of which meant in fact the disappearance of the no-
tion of a state language, because up to 16 languages in Georgia could profit by the
mentioned status. Despite everything, the leaders of that time were able to overcome such
obstacles, and, moreover, in a way that against this background not only none of the rights
of ethnic and religiousminorities were hurt, but on the contrary, a separate chapter was al-
located for them in the 1921 Constitution. The rights granted to minorities, by their es-
sence, were a progressive event for that time (Matsaberidze, 1996, p. 92).
This was the first time in the history of Georgia where, in Georgian reality, a modern
nation-state was created. The constitutionalism of that time created the institutional foun-
dations for universal equality and public involvement in politics. Ethnic minorities were
given right to receive education in their native language, as well as to use their native lan-
guage for the law, and also to publish newspapers and magazines in their own language.
The former Georgian Republic also provided for the autonomy of some ethno-religious
groups (the autonomies of Abkhazia and Muslim Georgia).
One interesting detail is the Constitution, which is typical of its time. The Constitution
of 1921 states that the source of legitimacy is the whole nation – “the power belongs to the
whole nation; parliament in the framework of this Constitution provides the power of the
nation” (The Constitution of Georgia 1921, Chapter 4, Article 52).
So this was the first case in Georgia, where on a formalised level the ethno-cultural
variety of society was put aside, and preference was given to civic affiliations. The
meaning of Georgian eri as the equivalent of the European “nation” in this case has
a non-ethnic dimension. This was the case even before the adoption of the first Georgian
Constitution. The word “nation” meant a large, secular collection of people, rather than
any ethnic or biological determined unity. The Georgian “nation” gained strong eth-
no-cultural significance more during the time of the Soviet Union (Dundua, Abashidze,
2009, p. 33).
While the independence of Georgia took place more on a formalised, judicial level,
ethnic and religious minorities were granted full and equal rights. Despite this, the reality
was a little different: the integration of the ethnicminorities remained a sensitive issue.
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Contemporary Georgia: challenges and problems
After dismantling the communist system, the external facade of the regime, which
was entirely based on fear and terror, was destroyed. Also, along with economic and so-
cial obstacles, arose the problems of ethnic and religious character. Typically, in most
cases, this kind of tension has its roots not in differences of worship, but in entirely differ-
ent factors. Often religious differences express only the tip of the iceberg, where deeper
meanings are hidden. In Georgia, which is characterised by its ethnic and religious diver-
sity, there clearly exists a risk of mutual incompatibility between different ethnic groups.
The still weak democratic institutions cannot ensure the transformation of society as one
whole, civil society. Accordingly, the level of alienation which has an ethnic and reli-
gious character, is quite high in Georgia.
By alienation, we do not mean only the alienation of ethnic Georgians from non-ethnic
Georgians. Alienation from the “named-nation” is quite high, even among non-ethnic
Georgians. Despite hundreds of years of living together, neither Tsarist Russia, nor the
Soviet regime nor the public-political space of an independent Georgia could even par-
tially eradicate such alliances between Georgians and non-Georgians and weaken exist-
ing ethnocentric points of view. In the first two cases – neither Tsarist Russia nor the
Soviet government had such aims. On the contrary, the politics they led (with different
aims and different means) servedmore to encourage a hostile spirit than to ensure integra-
tion and the eradication of alienation. During 20 years of independence, because of vari-
ous objective and subjective reasons, the Georgian State was also unable to fully get over
the problems concerning ethnic minorities (despite the fact that several steps were made
in this direction).We can single out several main issues concerning ethnicminorities:4
1) among non-ethnic Georgians, especially in densely populated regions (mostly in
urban and semi-urban spaces) the level of knowledge of Georgian is very low.
According to UN statistics, 24.6% of ethnic Armenians living in the region of
Samcxe –Javakheti and only 16.9% of ethnic Azeris living in the Qvemo Kartli
region know the official state language. Compared to this, in Tbilisi, which is an
urban zone, and at the same time where ethnic minorities are dispersed, the level
of knowledge of the state language in the same ethnic minorities is very high:
95.6% among ethnic Azeris and 96.4% among ethnic Armenians (National...,
October 2008, p. 36);
2) in the country, the level of unemployment is quite high, and the ethnic minori-
ties are no exception. In non-urban spaces, the level of unemployment is higher
than in urban spaces. As a result, the Georgian population has less ability to in-
teract with ethnic minorities in the public sphere. All of these factors are not
favourable for the full integration of ethnic minorities;
3) cultural and informational alliance. The closed cultural development of the eth-
nic groups causes a lack of interest and information about the cultural achieve-
ments of each other. Factually, in one cultural space, several subcultures exist,
alienated from each other;
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4 In this paper only ethnic Armenians and Azeris are the objects of our research.
4) the level of civic alienation is quite high too. The weak, civic institutionalised
space does not help the collaboration of ethnic groups and the appropriate arti-
culation of private interests.
In modern Georgia, the low level of knowledge of the state language among ethnic
minorities, and their accordingly low level of education, are part of the main factors (al-
though not the only ones) weakening civic integration. Since the beginning of independ-
ence neither Zviad Gamsaxurdia’s nor Eduard Shevardnaze’s governments made any
steps forward, increasing the inclusion of ethnic minorities in the public-political space.
Gamsaxurdia’s government was often condemned for conducting ethno-centric politics,
too (although we do not think it is proper to speak about the political course of any gov-
ernment which was in power for only a year and half, especially in regard of the difficult
internal and external context in which the newly established Georgian state found itself).
The period of Shevardnaze’s government was characterised by utter stagnation. The gov-
ernment did precisely nothing to increase the inclusion of ethnic minorities in the pub-
lic-political sphere of life. Accordingly, nothing was done to improve education levels
among them.
During the period of Shevardnaze’s governance, ethno-politic elites seemed to lead
mostly narrow political interests and did little to help the integration process of ethnic mi-
norities generally. The votes of minorities, mostly malleable segments of our society,
were of decisive importance during elections. Afterwards, though, the authorities were
inclined to improve neither the level of knowledge of Georgian, nor the level of educa-
tion, which logically would help to increase the amount of information available and im-
prove communication. As a result, political manipulation of ethnic minorities became
more complicated and dangerous.
After the Rose Revolution of 2003, the situation changed for the better. After 2003,
several steps were made by Saakashvili’s government to improve the situation in this
sphere, including two main directions:
1) teaching ethnic minorities Georgian;
2) taking care of the maintenance of minority cultural values and languages.
At a judicial level, such politics was reflected in the Law of General Education of
Georgia, where it is written: “[t]he citizens of Georgia for whom the Georgian language is
not their native language are granted a general education in their native language, accord-
ing to the national teaching plan, by law. In these institutions, it is mandatory to teach the
Georgian language” (Law of General Education of Georgia, article 4, chapter 3).
Despite the fact that the majority of non-ethnic Georgians do not know Georgian (or
know it very badly), most of them still consider Georgia their native country politically.
According to research carried out by SIDA5 in the regions of Kvemo Kartli and Samckhe
Javakheti, in response to the question: “do you consider Georgia as your native country,
and in the future do you connect your own income and employment with Georgia?”
– 96% of respondents answered that they linked their own incomes and the incomes of
their families to Georgia for at least the next five years (Ethnic and....November 1, 2012).
In our opinion, such a high percent of interviewed respondents who associate their future
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5 SIDA – Swedish International Cooperation Agency.
with Georgia to some degree must be a result of the policies initiated some years ago
(along with some other factors, too) and which continues in the sphere of education until
today.6
According to the law which has been applicable since 2010, representatives of ethnic
minorities take a part of the national exams, the so-called “General Aptitude”, in their na-
tive language – Azeri, Armenian, Ossetian and Abkhaz. As a result, we have seen a grow-
ing number of non-ethnic Georgian students in our high schools. Simultaneously, in the
universities, a 4+1 system (which means that students have to study Georgian intensively
for one year) was established. Also, during this same time, a quota system was set up
which determined the numbers of minorities who could study. It was distributed as fol-
lows: out of the total number of students who are pre-admitted, 5% of Azeris and 5% of
Armenians take their exams in the Azeri and Armenian languages, and 1% for Ossetian
andAbkhaz native speaking students take exams in their respective languages. As a result
of this policy the number of non-ethnic Georgians studying at Georgian Universities has
increased. All of these steps can, of course, be positively evaluated, although, there are
some considerations about this:
1. The quota system may be praiseworthy for a period of time. However, it is not
favourable to work with this system for a long period. Generally, quota systems
are a widely accepted practice all over the world. On the one hand, this system
has a lot of positive effects, but on the other hand it has some negative ones too.
In the case of Georgia, there are some possibilities that it may bring a higher
number of students to prestigious faculties where there are already a lot of stu-
dents, as opposed to the less prestigious faculties, where we may still have a shor-
tage of specialists. We do have to consider the steps made in this direction by
the government – specifically, that some of the less popular specialities in mo-
dern Georgia will be financed by the state, which in turn will augment the num-
ber of students in these specialities – in total 14 specialities.
2. On the other hand, we need to take into consideration that this regulated system
(where a part of the national exams can be taken in the language of your choice)
might reduce the motivation to learn the Georgian language for non-ethnic Geor-
gians (Janashia, 2009, p. 5). Therefore, being admitted to Georgian universities
as representatives of ethnic minorities (regardless of which language they take
their national exams in), students have to continue studying in the state langu-
age. The ethnic minorities, following their interests of integrating Georgia’s pu-
blic political space, will properly understand the benefits: the execution of an
educational programme at secondary school level, their inclusion in such pro-
grammes serving to their own benefit, as well as the improvement of their eve-
ryday connections to continue studying in universities and getting educated. This
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6 Unfortunately, statistical data like this for several years before do not exist denying us the opportu-
nity to compare data. Even during the statistical research carried out by SIDA questions which could
make it possible to determine the factors of the respondents’ dependency were not asked. Accordingly,
our consideration that the politics of education and teaching the Georgian language were somehow the
main reason for these opinions, could not be backed up by the results of any researchwe are aware of.
point of view is validated by the results of statistical research conducted by us
while working on these themes.7
In researching this paper, in-depth interviews were held with ethnic Azeris and Arme-
nians in the Akhalkalaki-Akhaltsikhe and Marneuli-Dmanisi regions. While analysing
the results of the interviews, two main problems appeared:
1) the number of hours for teaching Georgian is insufficient. According to a large
number of interviewed representatives of ethnic minorities, it is necessary to
develop the Georgian teaching course further to achieve results;
2) relations with ethnic Georgians in non-school spaces and at the level of every-
day communication are insufficient. Accordingly, some possible versions of how
to solve this problem were identified. Among them we can outline, for example,
compulsory military service – where non-ethnic Georgians could have an oppor-
tunity to communicate with Georgians; also, broadening projects such as “Patriot
Caps”.
Despite this, the evaluation of the politics of teaching Georgian and stimulating ethnic
minorities in gaining an education in Georgian Universities by passing exams in their na-
tive language is evaluated unequally positively.
Conclusion
Language is often perceivedmerely as a communication tool, but language groups ad-
hering to their language are not aiming at all to protect their ‘communication tool’; in this
case they are protecting their own national identity, culture and autonomous institutions.
Language, of course, is the main means of communication but, in addition, language is
closely related to national identity and cultural aspects. It is precisely the language factor
that determines the process of nation-forming and facilitates its further formation. The
examples mentioned, and reviewed by us in the paper, are further proof of the fact that
language and education play an important role in the process of creation of a nation as
a whole, as well as in strengthening integration and communication.
According to the examples reviewed during our study, taking into consideration the
ethnic minorities, their accommodation and, generally, their origin, a number of factors
are different in Georgia and, therefore, the educational policy pursued by the government
in this regard are qualitatively different from the cases of the Baltic States and Ukraine.
The policies of the Baltic States (and more specifically, of Latvia and Estonia) in this di-
rection were less aimed at helping the ethnic minorities in learning the local, native lan-
guages, and thus helping them (ethnic Russians) to be integrated in public and political
spaces. In Ukraine, raising the status of the Ukrainian language was more aimed at
strengthening Ukrainian national identity and at ethnic Ukrainians themselves, than it
was aimed at implementing the process of ‘Ukrainisation’ of ethnic non-Ukrainians.
PP 3 ’14 The politics of language and education in Georgia 181
7 During our research 10 ethnic Armenians and 10 Azeris were interviewed. Special thanks go to
Beqa Bagashvili, an Ilia Chavachavadze State University MA student, who, at the same time studying
Educational Politics, was working as a teacher of Georgian in Dmanisi, Jandara village, and to whomwe
are grateful for conducting in-depth interviews in this region.
The example of Georgia is quite different. After gaining independence, Georgia, in
contrast to Ukraine, had no (or very little) problem of identity. In addition, in contrast to
Ukraine, Georgia, with its geopolitical situation, has never been very close to Russia and,
at the same time, there is the fact of linguistic difference. In contrast to what happened in
many other former Soviet Union countries, Georgian, as the main means of communica-
tion in various fields of public or social life, never lost its importance in the population
(naturally, first of all we mean ethnic Georgians, but in the general public-political envi-
ronment operating in Russian was entirely free, acceptable, approved and encouraged
by the Soviet government). Among ethnic Georgians, it was less widespread and
deep-rooted in private or any other type of informal relations to use a non-Georgian lan-
guage (in this case Russian). Perhaps this reality is reflected in the fact that Georgian
never lost the status of an official language, even in the period of the Soviet Union (in
spite of efforts made in this direction). In addition, unlike the Baltic States and Ukraine,
Georgia had a heritage of completely different ethnic groups, in the form of ethnic minor-
ities, for whom Russian was not the native language (regardless of different degrees of
knowledge of Russian, it was not their native language). The case of Georgia was differ-
ent also from the above mentioned examples, in that, unlike many of the post-Soviet re-
publics, the Georgian government, by way of teaching Georgian to minorities, set
increasing their civic integration and activity in civic spaces as a goal. How successful the
steps taken in this regard were is another question. In addition, unlike the Baltic States, af-
ter gaining independence all citizens of the former Georgian Soviet automatically re-
ceived citizenship of the newly established, independent Republic of Georgia.
Until recently, the Georgian political establishment was very cautious regarding eth-
nic politics, and indecision in this regard was also quite common. Despite individual pro-
jects and efforts carried out in recent years, it is still difficult to say that the Georgian
government has consistent and effective policies to overcome the problems caused by its
ethnic and religious multi-membership. Although in this sense, there have recently been
some positive trends (for example, the development of the concept of tolerance and civic
integration and some programmes realised on the basis of it, removing from passports the
Soviet-style identification of ethnicity, holding certain educational programmes, tests of
skills on the Unified National Examinations in the languages of minorities, establishment
of the quota system, etc.) but these efforts are still quite fragmented and cannot be called
a well-formed, considered and coherent policy that in the near future will bring rapid and
effective changes in terms of civic integration.
Predominantly, ethnic groups (there is a better picture in the case of thinly settled eth-
nic minorities) are very poorly integrated into the general public-political space and prac-
tically do not participate in the process of building political institutions and the state.
Ethnic minorities generally are the passive recipients of the decisions taken in high politi-
cal echelons, rather than active participants in the development of the political agenda,
imbued with a high sense of civic responsibility and a spirit of self-consciousness. How-
ever, it should be also noted that the policy in the field of language teaching for ethnic mi-
norities is aimed at the longer term, and naturally its results cannot be immediately
apparent. Accordingly, those generations that will know the state language fluently, who
will be educated within a Georgian educational space, in the future will be one of (one of,
because knowledge of the Georgian language alone cannot solve the diverse range of
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problems) the guarantors and contributors to successful and well-grounded integration of
ethnic minorities in the public-political space.
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Polityka jêzykowa i edukacyjna w Gruzji
(analiza porównawcza: Gruzja, kraje ba³tyckie i Ukraina)
Streszczenie
W procesie zapewniania pe³nej integracji mniejszoœci narodowych w pañstwie, jedn¹ z najczêœciej
wymienianych przeszkód jest brak znajomoœci jêzyka pañstwowego przez owe mniejszoœci. Pomimo
faktu, ¿e Gruzja osi¹gnê³a pewien sukces w budowaniu demokracji, instytucje pañstwowe s¹ wci¹¿
s³abe, co z kolei przek³ada siê na trudnoœci w procesie integrowania ró¿nych grup religijnych i et-
nicznych z pañstwem. Brak zaufania do instytucji politycznych z jednej strony i s³aboœæ tych instytucji
z drugiej, prowadzi do wzajemnego wyobcowania i izolacji ró¿nych grup spo³ecznych. Rz¹d gruziñski,
w przeciwieñstwie do krajów ba³tyckich i Ukrainy, zbli¿aj¹c Gruzinów do tamtejszych grup mniej-
szoœciowych, postanowi³ zwiêkszyæ ich udzia³ i aktywnoœæ w przestrzeni obywatelskiej.
S³owa kluczowe: mniejszoœci etniczne, edukacja, polityka jêzykowa, integracja
PP 3 ’14 The politics of language and education in Georgia 183

